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The Sheriff is Coming to Cyberville: Trademark and 
Copyright Law and the Internet* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1960s the United States government established a com-
puter system which evolved into the entity known today as the Internet. 
The government had two original goals for the Internet, or ARPAnet (Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency) as it was then known. 1 The first goal 
was a military goal-the net was to be "a decentra~ized computer system 
that would ... be able to survive ... attack. "2 The second goal was that it 
would foster communication between scientists and military personnel. 3 
To these ends the Internet was launched with four computers in Utah and 
California.4 Today the Internet has several million host terminals with an 
estimated twenty-five million individual users. 5 
The Internet service has gone far beyond its primary role as a mili-
tary and scientific message carrier. It is, to use a well-worn phrase, the 
"Information Superhighway"-the most efficient trade route in the infor-
mation age. In addition to the military and scientific uses, the Internet is 
used by individuals, schools from the elementary to university level, and 
business. Business, in fact, has become one of the Internet's heaviest us-
ers. "As of July of 1995, approximately 70,000 commercial (.com) do-
main names had been registered with InterNIC."6 The explosion of com-
mercial registration continues as seen by the fact that "[i]n December 
1995 alone, more than 10,000 [commercial names] were regis-
tered-more than the total number issued in all of 1993."7 The explosive 
growth of the Internet, while expected, has nevertheless caused signifi-
cant legal problems for users. These problems arise in part from the fact 
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that, for most of the past ten years, the users of the net have gloried in the 
largely unregulated nature of "cyberspace."8 Internet's early users were 
"prideful of its reputation as a frontier town."9 The lack of regulation 
stems from the fact that the Internet, though still subsidized by the gov-
ernment, is not owned by anyone and has no real central management. 10 
So far as the legal issues on the Internet are concerned, the ones that 
seem most unsettled are intellectual property issues, specifically, trade-
mark and copyright infringement. 
While copyright infringement has come under some JUdicial scrutiny, 
so far trademark infringement has mostly escaped review. The debate 
surrounding copyright infringement has two major sides. One side envi-
sions the "information superhighway as a commercial center with intel-
lectual property as the prime commodity." 11 The other side views on-line 
services as "the computer-age equivalent of a post office, a library, or a 
bookstore [and] ... portray ... [the on-line service provider's] business[] 
as [a] passive conduit[] for information, which, like the post office, 
should not be responsible for what people write in letters or send in pack-
ages, particularly when these cyberpackages contain unauthorized copy-
righted materials .... "12 
The debate surrounding trademark infringement on the Internet is 
similarly bi-polar. Some argue that use of such trademarked names as on-
line addresses should be afforded the same broad protection afforded to 
trademarked names generally. They might point to language such as that 
found in A. Bourgois & Co. v. Katzel which states, "A trademark has 
come to be recognized as a property right of immense and incalculable 
value, whose proprietor is entitled to the strongest protection at the hands 
of the proper court" 13 to defend its position. Others hold the view that the 
Internet is new technology which cannot be held to the conventions of 
"old" trademark law. Their position is that use of a corporate name for a 
"web-site" is simply akin to a street address 14-that, for example, a site 
8. "Cyberspace" is a popular tenn for the Internet. 
9. Raskopf, supra note 6. 
10. Rex S. Heinke & Heather D. Rafter, Rough Justice in Cyberspace: Liability on the 
Electronic Frontier, II COMPUTER L. I, (1994). 
26. 
II. Vera Titunik, Who's Minding the On-Line Store?, CORP. COUNS. MAG., Sept. 1995, at 
12. ld. 
13. 274 F. 856, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1920). 
14. MTV Networks v. Curry explains an Internet cite in the following way: 
Each host computer providing Internet service ("site") has a unique Internet address. 
Users seeking to exchange digital information (electronic mail ("e-mail"), computer 
programs, images, music) with a particular Internet host requires the host's address in 
order to establish a connection. Hosts actually possess two fungible addresses: a numeric 
"IP" address such as "123.456.123.12" and an alphanumeric "domain name" such as 
"microsoft.com" with greater mnemonic potential. Internet domain names are similar to 
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address of mcdonalds.com is no more trademark infringement than some-
one who lives on "McDonalds" street writing his or her home address or 
receiving mail at that address. This paper will attempt to deal with both 
copyright and trademark infringement on the Internet. It will first discuss 
the trademark issue and then move to the copyright discussion. 
The trademark discussion will first illustrate the scope of the issue. It 
will next use a traditional trademark case to discern what the traditional 
trademark infringement standards are and then show how these tradi-
tional standards can be applied to the Internet. Next, this section will in-
vestigate actions taken by InterNIC and the government in an attempt to 
deal with the trademark difficulty. 
Because copyright infringement for those uploading copyrighted in-
formation on to the Internet has been established, the copyright section 
will look at the liability of Bulletin Board operators. It will discuss two 
decisions on the issue in an attempt to formulate some concrete rules 
which can be used in determining the liability of Bulletin Board opera-
tors. 
II. TRADEMARK AND THE INTERNET 
A. Introduction 
The trademark section will first discuss the causes for the trademark 
trouble, it will then discuss briefly each of the cases which have involved 
the trademark issue, and then look at a traditional trademark case in 
hopes of finding a solution. Finally, it will look at attempts by the 
Internet registration organization to deal with the situation. 
B. Background 
Since the well publicized case MTV Networks, 15 there has been a rash 
of corporate names registered by those not associated with the corpora-
tion in question. Because the Internet is run by a governing body known 
as "InterNIC" which refuses to accept the responsibility of checking for 
trademark violations and because InterNIC assigns address names on a 
first come-first served basis, protected corporate names can easily be reg-
telephone number mnemonics, but they are of greater importance, since there is no 
satisfactory equivalent to a telephone company white pages or directory assistance, and 
domain names can often be guessed. A domain name mirroring a corporate name may 
be a valuable corporate asset, as it facilitates communication with a customer base. The 
uniqueness of Internet addresses is ensured by the registration of the Internet Network 
Information Center ("InterNIC"), a collaborative project established by the National 
Science Foundation. 
867 F. Supp. 202, 203, 204 n.2 (S.D.NY. 1994). 
15. !d. 
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istered. One enterprising person registered seventeen Internet addresses 
including "hertz.com" and "trump.com." 16 The mentality of mass regis-
tration was summed up in the title of a WIRED magazine article: "Billions 
Registered: Right Now There Are No Rules to Keep You From Owning 
A Bitchin' Corporate Name as Your Own Internet Address." 17 The rush 
to register corporate names by those unaffiliated with the corporation 
may cost businesses millions. "As more companies venture on-line they 
may find their name of choice already registered. At stake is corporate 
identity in the information age. Companies whose potential names have 
been registered by others will have three choices: pick another name, buy 
the rights to the original one or sue." 18 
Pirating of corporate names is not the only problem. Because domain 
names are typically only eleven characters long, two companies which 
used the same name and had never come into contact previously could 
now be at odds on the Internet. For instance, Ford Motor Company may 
have the name "Ford" trademarked for automobile sales but the Ford 
Modeling Agency may have trademarked the same name in its field. On 
the Internet the first to register "Ford" as a domain name would prevail as 
a holder of a legitimate trademark and the other party would be left with-
out redress. 
Another problem exists in the fact that the Internet only allows one 
web-site per corporate entity, thus, all of a corporation's trademarks can-
not be used as web-cites. For instance, Ford Motor Company may not be 
registered for a domain name both under its corporate name and under 
trademark "Taurus" which is one of its car models. Thus, unless it is pos-
sible to argue trademark dilution when used by another, a corporate entity 
will only be able to use one of its trademarks as a domain name. 
In addition to the problem of restricted web-sites, perhaps the bigger 
problem lies in the fact that the Internet's traditional domain registration 
theory differs from traditional trademark law. Traditional trademark law 
gives protection to the first party to use a mark in commerce. 19 The 
Internet has traditionally ignored trademark law and assigned domain 
names on a first-registered, first-served basis. 
Despite the significance of the trademark issue and the scope of the 
problem, there has yet to be a case on domain name infringement decided 
by a court. While several cases have been filed, none as yet has made it to 
16. Stewart Ugdow, Names Lost in Cyberspace, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 16, 1994, at 824. 
17. Joshua Quittner, Billions Registered: Right Now, There Are No Rules to Keep You From 
Owning a Bitchin' Corporate Name as Your Own Internet Address, WIRED, October 1994, at 50 
(quoted in Brunei, infi'a, note 21, at I). 
18. !d. 
19. Powers, supra note 7. 
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trial. There is currently no legal pronouncement-no precedent deciding 
whether or not traditional trademark law applies to the Internet domain 
name. Despite this lack of case law, it is nevertheless instructive to dis-
cuss briefly each of these disputes. 
C. Trademark Infringement Examples 
The main cases in trademark infringement include cases involving 
MTV, McDonald's, Wired magazine, Kaplan Test Services, and 
Knowledgenet. Each is discussed below. 
1. MTV Networks v. Curry20 
Adam Curry, a former MTV video disc jockey, had set up as a web-
cite at the domain name "mtv.com" while employed at MTV. He had 
done so with the blessing of his superiors at the station. Internet users 
could find among other things '"MTV's Top Ten Music List,' outtakes 
from MTV Network's programming, a printout of the text of a dialog 
between MTVN characters Beavis and Butt-head, and a giveaway of 
MTV-logo T-Shirts to subscribers."21 After MTV and Curry parted com-
pany, he refused to surrender the domain name. MTV sued Curry for 
trademark violations as well as the breach of his employment contract. 
Curry counterclaimed for breach of oral contract. The case failed to issue 
any trademark/Internet precedent because the case was settled prior to a 
hearing on MTV's trademark claim. However, in a footnote to a hearing 
on MTV's motion to dismiss Curry's counterclaim, the court stated that, 
in its opinion, "domain names [were] similar to telephone number[s], but 
... are of greater importance ... . '.n This analysis is key to one aspect of 
trademark and domain names because it assumes that a descriptive mne-
monic telephone number (i.e. 1-800-0PERATOR for collect calls) may 
become a trademark so long as it has first acquired a "second meaning. "23 
Thus, an Internet name can become a trademark like a telephone number 
can. In settling the claim, Curry agreed to terminate his use of the web-
site. 24 
20. MTV Networks v. Curry. 867 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
21. Andre Brunei. Billions Registered, But No Rules: The Scope of Trademark Protection 
for Internet Domain Names. 7 No. 3 J. PROPRIETARY RTS 2, 7 (1995). 
22. MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. at 203 n. 2. 
23. Brunei, supra note 21, at 8. 
24. Raskopf, supra note 6. 
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2. Council of Better Business Bureaus v. Sloo 
When the Council of Better Business Bureaus tried to use its "BBB" 
trademark as an Internet domain name it found that "bbb.com" had al-
ready been registered by an individual-Mark Sloo. Mr. Sloo likened the 
first-come, first served policy of the Internet to a "land-rush."25 The coun-
cil filed suit in U.S. District Court in Kansas City but has had to use the 
site "cbbb.com" until the suit is settled. The council maintains that "Our 
communications with Mr. Sloo indicate that his only real interest is to 
barter the BBB domain names."26 
3. McDonald's v. Ronald Quittner 
Mr. Quittner requested and was granted the name "mcdonalds.com" 
after McDonald's had registered "mcd.com." Quittner, a reporter who 
describes himself as a "pain in the McButt, "27 began taking suggestions at 
his web-cite as to what he should do with the name: "You tell me. I could 
auction it off. I could hold on to it as a trophy, I could set up a Mosaic 
home page, explaining the difference between McDonalds and Josh 
'Ronald' Quittner. Got a suggestion? Send it to ronald 
@mcdonalds.com. "28 Half of the suggestions told Quittner to sell the do-
main name to McDonald's for a large sum of money and the other half 
suggested that Quittner set up a home page to "promot[ e] vegetarianism 
over hamburger consumption."29 McDonald's was eventually able to get 
the domain name back for $3,500 and an agreement that the settlement 
money be used to put a New York City school on the Internet. Once 
again-no good precedent. 
4. Wired v. WIRE 
This dispute is slightly different because it involves two domain 
names that were not exactly alike. Wired, a computer magazine, used 
"wired.com" and WIRE a computer network devoted to women's issues 
used "wire.net."30 Because of the similarity, Wired convinced WIRE to 
change its name to Women's Wire and its web-cite to "wwire.net," and in 
return paid half of the cost of the name change.31 That Wired was con-
25. Bruce McDonald, Trademarks and the Internet, CATALOG AGE, Sept. I, 1995, at 83. 
26. Martin Rosenberg, E-mail Conflict Triggers a Lawsuit; KC Man Controls Internet 
Address That a Business Council Wants to Claim, KANSAS CITY STAR, May 16, 1995, at 03. 
27. Joshua Quittner, Life in Cyberspace: You Deserve a Break Today, NEWSDAY, Oct. 7, 
1994, at A5 (quoted in Brunei, supra note 21, at 1). 
28. Quittner, supra note 17, at 56 (quoted in Brunei, supra note 21, at I). 
29. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 7. 
30. Brunei, supra note 21. 
31. !d. 
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cemed about the entity name WIRE as well as the domain name illus-
trates the point that domain names are more difficult to distinguish than 
names in print because there is no use of stylized writing in domain 
names, and thus it is more difficult to differentiate between close 
names. 32 
5. Princeton Review v. Kaplan 
Barbara Kantrowitz and Jennifer Tanaka reported in Newsweek that: 
Earlier this year the animosity between the nation's largest 
standardized-test-preparation companies-Stanley Kaplan and The 
Princeton Review -hit a new low. On March 1, [1994] TPR secured 
the address "kaplan.com" tying up an Internet address its competitor 
would covet. "It's an act of corporate theft," says Kaplan CEO Jonathan 
Grayer. According to John Katzman, TPR's president, the stunt was 
"done entirely for fun and to irritate them." It worked, especially when 
Kaplan execs realized that TPR was soliciting Kaplan horror stories 
through this address.33 
Princeton's president offered to sell the domain name for a case of 
beer, domestic or imported.34 This offer was rebuffed. 
Eventually the case was submitted to binding arbitration with Prince-
ton arguing that the kaplan.com domain name with disparaging informa-
tion about Kaplan would not result in confusion because the consumer 
would realize that the information was not provided by Kaplan. Kaplan 
used traditional trademark law to argue that "the unauthorized use of 
Kaplan's mark on computer databases available to millions of people is, 
without question, a violation of the trademark law."35 As a result of the 
arbitration, Princeton was ordered to "(1) notify the InterNIC that it was 
relinquishing all rights to the kaplan.com domain name; (2) cause the 
cancellation or revocation of its prior registration of the name; and (3) 
request InterNIC to transfer the name to Kaplan."36 Princeton was not 
required to pay damages or attorney's fees because there was "inadequate 
showing of actual damages or intentional decept[tion] or bad faith" by 
Princeton.37 
32. !d. 
33. Barbara Kantrowitz & Jennifer Tanaka, All in a Name, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 5, 1994, at 
10. 
34. Hamilton, supra note 2. 
35. Raskopf, supra note 6, at 3 (citations omitted). 
36. Raskopf, supra note 6, at 4. 
37. !d. 
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6. KnowledgeNet, Inc. v. Boone38 
KnowledgeNet, an Illinois corporation, had registered its name as a 
trademark and a servicemark. Boone was unaware of the corporation and 
founded a trade association called Knowledgenet and also used the word 
as his domain name. Upon discovering the domain name the Illinois com-
pany demanded that Boone cease using knowledgenet.com. Boone did 
not comply and a suit was filed against him. Boone was not able to sus-
tain his claim because of mounting legal costs. By submitting to a con-
sent decree Boone was forced to give up the domain name, send copies of 
the decree with a self addressed stamped post card asking the members of 
his association not to use the word "knowledgenet," and also send a copy 
of the consent decree to two publications which had written about the 
trade association.39 "Although it's not precedent setting in a formal sense, 
the settlement does not give much comfort to those asserting that a com-
puter address don't (sic) violate a similar-looking and sounding trade-
tnark. "40 
D. Application: Traditional Trademark Law and the Internet 
As the cited trademark/domain name disputes illustrate, though there 
is no precedent showing that traditional trademark law will ultimately 
prevail, the trademark infringer has relinquished the offending domain 
name in each case. This would seem to be of comfort to all of the corpo-
rations who have yet to register trademarks as domain names. However, 
without actual precedent it is only of small comfort. 
It will be the goal of this section to use a traditional trademark in-
fringement case, Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Sunriver Corp., 41 to begin to 
draw a blueprint showing that traditional trademark law is not obsolete in 
dealing with on-line issues. Following the discussion of traditional trade-
mark issues, the section applies the traditional law to the Internet issue 
and then discusses other solutions which have been offered to solve the 
problem. It is the ultimate goal of this section to demonstrate that tradi-
tional trademark law can indeed be used to protect trademarks used in the 
on-line arena. 
38. Knowledgenet, Inc. v. Boone, No. 94-CY-7195 (N.D.ll1. Eastern Div. filed Jan. 25, 
1995). 
39. Retreat and Surrender: Internet Trademark Suit Fizzles. Boone Folds and Agrees to 
Give Domain Name to KnowledgeNet. INFO L. ALERT: VOORHEES REPORT, July 7, 1995 at 2. 
40. !d. 
41. Sun Microsystems v. Sunriver Colfl., 1995 WL 390696 (N.D.Cal.) 
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1. Sun Microsystems v. Sunriver 
a. The Facts. Sun Microsystems, Inc. (Sun) is a desktop computer 
workstation manufacturer. All of Sun's products bear the Sun mark or 
have a Sun-prefixed name. The company owns eleven federally regis-
tered Sun-prefixed names and marks and has used more than thirty-five 
Sun-based names and marks.42 In 1987 SunRiver began manufacturing 
computer terminals which were host dependent. At that time Sun sent a 
cease and desist letter to SunRiver demanding that the company stop us-
ing the SunRiver mark. SunRiver assured Sun that it had no intention of 
selling high-end workstations and thus, that it would not be in direct 
competition with Sun.43 This placated Sun. "In 1988 SunRiver got a fed-
erally registered trademark for its SUNRIVER mark for use with 'com-
puters, computer peripherals and computer programs.' "44 Problems 
erupted between the two companies again in 1993 when, in an effort to 
expand, SunRiver began competing with Sun by introducing a line of 
products for the UNIX system. Sun again wrote a letter to SunRiver de-
manding that SunRiver cease and desist. SunRiver failed to respond and 
Sun filed a petition with the Patent and Trademark Office to cancel the 
registration of the SUNRIVER mark.45 SunRiver has continued to enter 
markets in which Sun sells products and has used the SunRiver name. 
Sun fears that the expanded use of the SUNRIVER name will likely con-
fuse the public.46 Sun moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent 
SunRiver from using the SUNRIVER trademark in areas in which it is in 
direct competition with Sun. The court granted Sun's motion for an in-
junction because it found, through its analysis, that there was "a combi-
nation of probable success on the merits and the possiblity of irreparable 
injury" and "that serious questions are raised and the balance of hard-
ships tips sharply in its [Sun's] favor."47 
b. The Court's Reasoning in Sun Microsystems. First the Sun court 
cites the Lanham Act standard for trademark infringement. The Act 
makes a party liable for trademark infringement if the use of a mark "is 
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.48 Sun then 
cites Levi-Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc. 49 for the proposition that to 
prevail in a trademark infringement case the complaining party must 
42. !d. at 1. 
43. !d. 
44. !d. 
45. /d. 
46. !d. at 1. 
47. /d. at 2. 
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1996). 
49. 778 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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show that: ( 1) it has valid, protectable trademarks or trade names and (2) 
there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the 
products.50 
(1) The first prong: a valid protectable trademark. 
a. Did Sun have a valid, protectable trademark? The court 
easily dismisses the first requirement on the basis that trademark registra-
tion is "prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of 
the registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, 
and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in com-
merce."51 Because of Sun's registration and use of the "Sun" mark, the 
court concludes its analysis of the first point by simply stating, "The 
ownership, validity and protectability of Sun's marks is undisputed. "52 
b. Did SunRiver have a valid, protectable trade-
mark? SunRiver does not dispute the fact that Sun's trademark is valid. 
Its argument is "that its federal registration of the SUNRIVER mark ren-
ders that mark incapable of infringing any other mark. "53 The court dis-
misses this contention saying that "contrary to SunRiver's argument, reg-
istration does not automatically confer the right to use, nor does it consti-
tute a defense to a claim of infringement by a senior user. Rather, the 
touchstone of ownership rights is prior use-and SunRiver cannot show a 
use prior to Sun's."54 Thus, the court concludes that SunRiver's registra-
tion of its mark is irrelevant and that "Because of its prior use, Sun is the 
senior user with the right to exclude any junior user of the mark where 
such use is likely to cause confusion."55 
(2) The second prong: The likelihood of confusion. The Sun 
court then turns to the second prong used in deciding whether or not a 
trademark infringement has occurred. It cites eight factors from AMF Inc. 
v. Sleekcraft Boats56 that are used to determine the likelihood of confu-
sion. These eight factors are: ( 1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of 
the goods; (3) similarity of the sight, sound and meaning of the marks; 
(4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of 
goods and degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) de-
50. !d. at 1354. 
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1996). 
52. Sun Microsystems v. SunRiver, 1995 WL 390696 at 2. 
53. !d. 
54. !d. at 3. 
55. !d. 
56. 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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fendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of 
the product line. 57 
a. Strength of the mark. Arbitrary marks which do not de-
scribe or suggest the products or services are stronger than descriptive 
marks. The stronger the mark the more protection afforded. 58 The court in 
its analysis holds that though "sun" is a common word, "[ c ]ommon 
words are arbitrary as long as they do not describe the product with 
which they are used."59 The court determines, "Given their distinctive-
ness and notoriety, the SUN marks are strong marks worthy of a high de-
gree of protection. "60 
b. Proximity of the goods. When goods in question are re-
lated the likelihood of consumer confusion is enhanced.61 In the instant 
case, the court held that when SunRiver began to expand into markets 
previously served by Sun, the danger of consumer confusion was en-
hanced. The court states, "The proximity of Sun and SunRiver's products 
make it more likely that consumers will think that SunRiver's goods 
come from Sun."62 
c. Similarity of the marks. Regarding the similarity of the 
marks the court states, "In assessing the similarity of marks, the court 
should examine the sight, sound and meaning of the marks, keeping in 
mind that the similarities are more important than the differences. "63 The 
court determined that "the marks are largely identical-SUNRIVER 
sounds a lot like SUN and looks a lot like SUN."64 Ultimately, the court 
decided that the difference between the marks is subtle and "does not 
come close to overriding the close similarities in sight and sound."65 
d. Actual confusion. The court finds little evidence of what 
it terms "actual confusion" resulting from the similarities between the 
trademarks. It notes, however, that this standard may not be at issue be-
cause the case is "forward-looking" rather than remedial.66 The court 
57. /d. at 348-349. 
58. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d. 1280, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992). 
59. Sun Microsystems v. SunRiver, 1995 WL 390696 at 3. 
60. /d. 
61. E.J. Gallo Winery, 967 F.2d at 1291. 
62. Sun at 4. 
63. /d. (citations omtted). 
64. /d. 
65. /d. 
66. /d. 
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seems to infer that in seeking injunctive relief this standard will not apply 
to the extent that it would in a suit seeking damages. 
e. Convergence of marketing channels. Not much evi-
dence is presented in Sun regarding the convergence of marketing chan-
nels. However, the court notes that "Sun has offered evidence indicating 
that Sun and SunRiver both sell to distributors who sell their software 
products a part of a 'bundle' of products."67 
f Type of the goods and degree of customer care. It is 
noted here that "Consumers typically exercise more care when they buy 
expensive products than when they buy cheap products."68 The Sun court 
concludes from this fact that confusion due to trademark infringement is 
"less likely when the goods are expensive."69 
While Sun and SunRiver do compete in an expens1ve 
field-computer work stations-they also compete in an inexpensive 
field-Internet software tools and applications. Because the two compa-
nies compete in fields with varying price ranges and thus, varying levels 
of possible consumer confusion, the court calls the factor a "wash. "70 
g. Intent in selecting the mark. While intent is not a neces-
sary element of trademark infringement, the presumption is that a party 
intending to deceive consumers will be successful. 71 The court agrees 
with the Sun argument that SunRiver's use of the SUNRIVER mark is "a 
thinly veiled attempt to trade off Sun's more established name."72 This 
category strikes directly against SunRiver because the court does not be-
lieve SunRiver's explanation about the use of its mark in newly acquired 
markets convincing. 
h. Expansion of product lines. The court holds that the 
existence of Sun and SunRiver as competitors will expand. In other 
words, the competing companies will likely become competitors in more 
fields. In the court's view, "This probable expansion of product lines 
adds to the likelihood of confusion."73 
67. Jd. 
68. ld. at 5. 
69. /d. 
70. /d. 
71. See Sun Microsystems v. SunRiver, WL 390696 at 4. 
72. /d. 
73. /d. at 8. 
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C. The Sun Court's Conclusion 
After weighing the eight factors considered under the likelihood of 
confusion analysis, the court states that Sun has shown the requisite prob-
ability of success on the merits to warrant awarding the injunction 
sought. The court states: 
Taken together, the factors demonstrate a likelihood of confusion. In-
deed almost all of the factors suggest that SunRiver's use of the 
SUNRIVER mark is likely to confuse consumers. The most convincing 
of these are the strength of Sun's marks, the close similarity of the com-
peting marks in appearance and sound, and the proximity of the goods 
in light of SunRiver's recent acquisition of companies in direct competi-
tion with Sun.74 
III. ADDITIONAL TRADEMARK CONSIDERATIONS 
While Sun is a good case to examine in order to understand traditional trade-
mark infringement factors, it does miss two factors that need to be considered 
before discussing Internet trademark infringement. These factors are: (1) The 
reason for trademark protection is to protect a property right as well as the inter-
est in the reputation built by the trademark owner; and (2) trademark protection 
may extend beyond products in the same market. 
A. Trademark Protection as a Property Right and as a Protection of 
Reputation 
It may seem odd that trademarks are considered property, but this is widely 
accepted. The court in Enoch Morgan's Sons Co. v. Ward stated that "If a word 
or symbol ... has been duly appropriated as a trademark, it becomes property, 
[which a competitor has no right to use], either alone or in connection with mat-
ter to which its owner lays no claim, without ... [such] owner's consent."75 As 
pointed out previously, trademarks as property rights have been recognized as 
being of "immense and incalculable value."76 It is important to continuing trade-
mark protection that there be a property right attached to a mark because without 
the right, trademark infringement litigation is left simply as a consumer protec-
tion device. This may call into question a corporation's standing to bring suit, 
since without a right to defend, there is no harm done, and thus, perhaps only the 
consumer would have standing to bring suit. 
Closely related to the trademark-as-property issue is protection of reputation 
which might be lost through an infringement. Courts have understood that pro-
tection of reputation is as important as protection of a trademark's property 
74. Jd. 
75. 152 F. 690, 692 (7th Cir. 1907). 
76. A. Bourjois & Co., 274 F. 856, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1920). 
88 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 11 
value. The court in Alaska Sales & Service, Inc. v. Rutledge stated, "Protection is 
afforded to the reputation which one party has acquired for his goods and ser-
vices; and the public to the use of means distinguishing them from other 
goods."77 In Nu-Enamel Corporation of Illinois v. Armstrong Paint & Varnish 
Works the court reached a similar conclusion when it said, "A manufacturer ... 
is entitled to the reputation he has established and the public has the right to rely 
upon his distinctive means of distinguishing between his and other goods. "78 The 
protection of reputation also serves to ensure that trademark litigation is not 
merely a consumer protection device, but recognizes that the complaining corpo-
ration has an interest to protect. 
B. 17ze Extension of Trademark Protection Beyond Similar Markets 
Though the Sun court may not have intended to limit trademark infringe-
ments to similar markets, its language, nevertheless, seems at least tacitly to do 
just that. It discusses the importance of the fact that the two companies were 
competing in the same market in finding likely consumer confusion. 79 It is im-
portant, then, to clarify the fact that trademark infringement isn't restricted to 
directly competing goods, services, or companies. The court in Baker v. Simmons 
Co. stated that, "protection [given trademark owners] is not confined to the goods 
upon which it is or has been, used ... but extends to products which would be 
reasonably thought by the buying public to come from the same source if sold 
under the same mark."80 A Florida court went even further in the protection of 
trademarks used on unrelated goods. In Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. the court stated: 
One's interest in a trade-mark or trade name ... (is] to be protected 
against simulation, ... not only on competing goods, but on goods so 
related in the market to those on which the trademark or trade name is 
used that the good or ill repute of one type of goods is likely to be vis-
ited upon the other.81 
After considering these issues in addition to the issues considered in Sun, 
we are prepared to investigate trademark issues as they deal with the 
Internet. 
V. Trademark Infringement and the Internet 
Thus far this section has looked at a traditional eight-factor trade-
mark analysis and discussed additional trademark issues which might 
effect the extension of traditional trademark issues onto the Internet. It is 
77. 128 F. Supp. at 2 (D. Alaska 1955). 
78. 95 F.2d 448 at 450 (7th Cir. 1938). 
79. See Sun Microsystems v. SunRiver, 1995 WL 390696 at 4. 
80. 307 F.2d 458, 462 (1st Cir. 1962)(quoting Standard Brands v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 
37 (2nd Cir. 1945)). 
81. 306 F.2d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 1962)(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 730)). 
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important to remember at this point that while there have been several 
instances of corporate name Internet site registration, none of the in-
stances has resulted in precedent setting litigation. In each case thus far 
the parties have settled. While one case, Council of Better Business Bu-
reaus Inc. v. Sloo, is still undecided, the prospects for settlement look 
good. Because of the lack of a precedent we are left to speculate. 
Granted, a speculation of this sort will not be effective for all fact pat-
terns but it will help form the approach that will allow traditional trade-
mark law to be applied to the Internet. 
A. The Facts 
We need not create an elaborate fact pattern for our trademark in-
fringement case, since most Internet trademark infringement cases are 
fairly similar. In the scenario which we use, a well-known corporate 
name is registered in hope of securing some sort of monetary settlement 
for the right to use the name. The analysis will be made by first applying 
the standards in Sun and then looking at the additional issues which have 
been previously explored. 
B. The First Sun Issue in Reference to the Internet 
The threshold issue in the Sun analysis is whether the corporate entity 
has a valid protectable trademark.82 In every case so far contested, the 
complaining entity has had a valid trademarked name. This threshold is-
sue falls to the favor of the complaining corporate entity. 
C. The Eight Factors Considered 
It is next necessary to consider the eight factors taken from Sun 
which the court used to determinine whether there is a likelihood of con-
fusion for a consumer when a corporate or trade name is misappropriated 
for use on the Internet. The factors as cited previously include: (1) 
strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the 
sight, sound and meaning of the marks; ( 4) evidence of actual confusion; 
(5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and degree of care likely 
to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant's intent in selecting the 
mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product line. 
I. Strength of the mark 
This analysis is difficult to make based on the fact that we do not 
have a specific company named. However, the Sun court seemed to apply 
82. Sun Microsystems v. SunRiver, I 995 WL 390696 at 2. 
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this test broadly enough to include any type of arbitrary mark. Many cor-
porate names are arbitrary. For example, the name Hertz has little to do 
with the renting of automobiles and the name McDonalds little to do with 
hamburgers. However, this test must really be applied on a case by case 
basis. 
2. Proximity of the marks 
This, some would argue, is a difficult point for the complaining party 
in the case of an Internet infringement case. However, when it is under-
stood that the Internet is a clearing house for information and that every 
corporate entity wants to have information available to customers or po-
tential customers it is easy to see that the commodity in question here is 
information. In that respect all types of information exist in the same 
broad category. Thus, all of the information offered on the internet is re-
lated under the category of "information." 
3. Similarity of the marks 
In the case of name appropriation on the Internet, this is an easy win 
for the complaining entity, because not only is the mark similar, it is 
identical. 
4. Actual confusion 
As in the Sun case, in many instances there may be no actual evi-
dence of consumer confusion. However, because Internet addresses are 
all based on names, and because there is no other identifier with the 
Internet name, the chance for consumer confusion has to be considered 
high. 
5. Convergence of marketing channels 
On its face this would seem difficult for a corporation to prove; how-
ever, when we consider that the commodity exchanged on the Internet is 
information not hamburgers or cars, it is relatively easy to see that the 
Internet, as the single Market Channel for on-line information, is the ulti-
mate in the convergence of a marketing channel. 
6. Type of goods and degree of consumer care 
As put forth in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats consumers typically ex-
ercise more care when they buy expensive products than when they buy 
cheap products. Because much of the information provided by a web-site 
is free, the possibility for consumer confusion is high. 
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7. Intent in selecting the mark 
In our hypothetical case, the person registering the corporate name is 
especially vulnerable to this part of the analysis. If the sole purpose for 
selecting the name for a web-site is to extract some sort of money from a 
corporation, a court could easily find that there was an intent to deceive 
customers. 
8. Expansion of Product Lines 
Of all of the eight parts of the confusion test this is probably the least 
applicable to the Internet situation. Because information is the product, 
and the Internet is the only "marketing channel" there really is no room 
for expansion of product lines. The person registering the name and the 
corporation are already competing fully in the information marketplace. 
D. The Other Factors and Their Bearing on the Issue 
1. Trademark as property 
This factor is especially important in extending traditional trademark 
law to the Internet because if the ownership of a trademark is indeed a 
property right, then it must be protected regardless of where the mark is 
infringed upon. It does not matter, for example, where my car is stolen. 
Whether it is taken from my garage or whether it is taken from a public 
parking lot, my car has still been stolen. Likewise, the forum or setting in 
which a trademark is stolen should not matter. 
2. Protection of Reputation 
This again is a very important consideration in the extension of tradi-
tional trademark law to the Internet. If one of the purposes of traditional 
trademark law is to protect the corporation's reputation which is associ-
ated with its trademark or trade name, then that protection should extend 
to all forums. It is just as possible to tarnish a reputation on the Internet 
as it is in any other forum. In fact, because the commodity of the Internet 
is information and because the flow of the information is relatively unre-
stricted, it is possible that a reputation in the on-line community is even 
more fragile than it is outside of the Internet. 
Protection of corporate reputation on the Internet is fragile, as can be 
seen in the controversy between Kaplan and Princeton Review. Princeton 
registered kaplan.com on the internet. Kaplan and Princeton are prime 
competitors in the test preparation market. Princeton used the kaplan.com 
site to print promotional information for its company. Thus, when an 
internet user accessed kaplan.com expecting information on Kaplan, the 
user was given anti-Kaplan information by Princeton. The case was arbi-
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trated and settled out of court, but illustrates the danger to a carefully cul-
tivated corporate reputation.83 
3. Protection of the Public 
The public deserves protection from misrepresentation of product 
source as a matter of policy. The customer is especially vulnerable to 
misrepresentation on the Internet because there is no immediate way to 
check the source of information. All that the consumer knows is that the 
information comes from a site which claims to be the on-line address for 
a corporation. With this type of blind information a consumer needs the 
protection of knowing that by accessing hertz.com it is accessing Hertz. 
VI. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST USING TRADEMARK LAW FOR THE 
INTERNET 
While there appears no logical reason not to apply traditional trade-
mark law to the Internet, there are, nevertheless, arguments posited by 
those who do not believe that the Internet should be held to the traditional 
law. Two main arguments support this position: (1) that Internet ad-
dresses aren't trademark infringements; and (2) that the InterNIC bylaws 
already supply regulations for use of trademarked names as sites. 
The first argument that Internet addresses are not trademark infringe-
ments, as discussed previously, is that an Internet address is akin to a 
street address. A web site of hertz.com is akin to living on Hertz street. 
Unfortunately, those who hold this view fail to acknowledge the fact that 
there is only one "house" on an Internet street. 
The second argument is that the InterNIC should be allowed to gov-
ern the Internet and the trademark issues. To this end InterNIC issued an 
internal dispute resolution policy statement in July of 1995. In the policy 
InterNIC denies all responsibility in "screening requested Domain names 
to determine if the use of a Domain Name by an Applicant may infringe 
upon the right(s) of a third party."84 InterNIC tries to deflect responsibil-
ity by saying that: 
Upon requesting to register a Domain Name represents and warrants as 
follows: (1) Applicant's statements in the application are true and Ap-
plicant has the right to use the Domain Name as requested in the Appli-
cation; (2) Applicant has a bona fide intention to use the Domain Name 
83. Charles Bruno, Lawyers Raise Concerns About Internet Trade. NETWORK WORLD, May 
15, 1995, at 31. 
84. NSI Domain Dispute Resolution Policy Statement, 
[URL ftp://rs.intemic.net/policy/intemic/intemic-domain-l.txt]. 
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on a regular basis on the Internet; and (3) The use or registration of Do-
main Name by Applicant does not interfere with or infringe the right of 
any third party in any jurisdiction with respect to trademark, service 
mark, trade name, company name or any other intellectual property. 85 
93 
The document further maintains that "in the event that the applicant 
breaches any of its obligations under this policy statement, NSI 
(lnterNIC) may request that Applicant relinquish the Domain Name in a 
written notice describing the alleged breach."86 Despite its tough talk, it is 
doubtful that InterNIC has the ability or the desire to correctly govern use 
of corporate or trade names by individuals. The only workable alternative 
is that the legal system step in and apply trademark law to the Internet 
infringement issues. 
IV. FURTHER EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM 
As has been illustrated, several disputes have arisen regarding the use 
of trademarks as domain names on the Internet. If the data regarding the 
general use of trademarks as domain names is accurate many similar dis-
putes will occur. In an effort to deal sanely with future disputes, InterNIC 
amended its policies once again in November of 1995 and Congress held 
hearings to examine the possibility of government regulation of 
cyberspace. 
A. InterNIC Action 
In response to the ever expanding concerns of owners of trademarks, 
InterNIC amended its procedures in November of 1995. The new policy 
steps back from InterNIC's previous position. The new policy claimed no 
responsibility for trademark infringement by domain names. David 
Graves of Network Solutions Inc. said of the policy change, "Since we 
don't have any jurisdiction over name disputes and are not in the position 
to deal with issues that belong in the courts, ... we wanted to protect our-
selves from any accusations of aiding and abetting trademark infringe-
ment."87 To this end InterNIC agreed to freeze any domain names which 
it had been notified were genuinely disputed. An owner of a federally 
registered trademark can file a complaint if its "identical mark is regis-
85. !d. at I. 
86. !d. at 2. 
87. More Protection is Due for Internet Mail Addresses, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 
31, 1995, at 6H. 
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tered as a domain name by someone else."88 The new policy further re-
quires that 
If the original domain name owner has prior rights in the identical 
name or can also produce a federal trademark registration, NSI's 
policy allows the original domainname [sic] owner to continue to 
use the name if it posts bond and agrees to indemnify NSI against 
legal liability and expense. If the original domain name owner does 
not agree to this, or if the original domain name owner does not 
have prior rights or a federal registration in the identical name, NSI 
suspends the domain name registration pending the outcome of 
whatever court or arbitration proceedings the two parties may bring 
against each other. 89 
In addition to the amendment of procedures, InterNIC began charg-
ing a fee for the first time in August of 1995. It now costs $50 per year to 
maintain a domain name. 
NSI's theory was that a fee ... would cut down on the number of such 
[domain name] speculators. It is doubtful that the policy has had this 
result. After a brief dip in the number of domain [name] registrations, it 
appears that the number of applications is continuing to increase at a 
geometric rate. 90 
B. Congressional Hearings 
In response to the trademark issue on the Internet the House Judiciary 
Committee held hearings in the early part of February 1996 for H.R. 
2441. In these hearings Catherine Simmons-Gill, the President of the In-
ternational Trademark Association ("INTO"), gave a statement in which 
she maintained that no congressional action is needed and that INTO is 
"of the view that the Lanham Act is sufficiently broad and elastic to pro-
vide relief to trademark owners against those who adopt domain names 
that infringe upon or dilute the rights of the mark's rightful owner."91 
Congress has yet to take action. 
88. Prepared Statement of Catherine Simmons-Gill, President of the International 
Trademark Association, Before the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts 
and Intellectual Property on H.R. 2441, Feb. 8, I 996, at 2. 
89. !d. at 4. 
90. !d. at 5. 
9I. Summary of Statement of the International Trademark Association on H.R. 2441, the 
"Nil Copyright Protection Act of 1995," Feb. 8, I 996. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
By looking at a traditional trademark infringement case and the other 
relevant trademark issues it becomes clear that there is no other good op-
tion for protection of marks than the traditional trademark law. The eight 
issues the Sun court used to find a trademark infringement illustrate the 
fact that the traditional law can work in governing domain name trade-
mark violations. Further, while InterNIC and Congress have made some 
moves to enact new laws, the fact that traditional trademark law applies 
so easily to Internet violations suggests that maybe no action need be 
taken. Perhaps a 1927 case said it best "A trade-mark ... must be good 
against all infringements, or against none. "92 A trademark should be pro-
tected regardless of the forum. To do anything less is not logical and 
leaves corporate names and reputations at the mercy of unpredictable 
speculations. Traditional trademark law must be extended to Internet 
sites. 
VI. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND THE INTERNET 
A. Introduction 
The current state of copyright law and the Internet is not as chaotic as 
the state of trademark law and the internet. This is mainly because prece-
dent exists--there are cases in which the issue of copyright infringement 
on the Internet has been dealt with. It seems that traditional copyright law 
has prevailed in the scuffle. However, several interesting issues do re-
main. It is the goal of this section to examine the case law on this topic 
and make an effort to provide some concrete rules that can be adhered to 
when dealing with copyright issues on-line. To accomplish this task it is 
important to first look at traditional copyright law and to define where it 
currently stands. This will also allow us to see how courts have used the 
traditional approach to cope with the non-traditional nature of Internet 
copyright issues. These issues include the liability of bulletin board ser-
vices and liability ofthose who actually down-load the information. 
B. Traditional Copyright Law 
Traditional copyright law provides protection to the "authors" of cre-
ative works, giving authors a "bundle of rights."93 These rights include 
"the exclusive right to reproduce the work, to display or perform the 
work, to distribute the work, and to prepare adaptations or derivations on 
92. Oakland Chemical Co. v. Bookman, 22 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1927). 
93. STEPHEN ELIAS, PATENT, COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK: A DESK REFERENCE TO 
INTELLECTIJAL PROPERTY LAW 69 ( 1996). 
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the work."94 The copyright protection extends only "to literal expression, 
not to ideas and concepts underlying the expression."95 To be copyright-
able the work must fit into three criteria: 1) the work must be original; 2) 
the work must be fixed in a tangible medium of expression; and 3) the 
work must display creativity (this creativity portion is broadly inter-
preted, for example, the alphabetic list known as the white pages would 
likely not be considered creative).96 
The list of infringing conduct includes: 1) unauthorized copies for 
commercial purposes; 2) use of a composer's tune with different words; 
3) including in a computer program original subroutines authored by 
someone else; 4) adapting a work from one medium to another; and 5) 
plagiarism.97 
The main defense to copyright infringement is the fair use doctrine 
which allows use in non-commercial ways. These may include use of a 
work in teaching, research, scholarship, criticism and joumalism.98 In 
addition, the fair use doctrine covers inadvertent use. While inadvertent 
users must cease the infringing activity, they don't pay damages.99 The 
Copyright Act of 1976 includes four factors to determine fair use they 
are: 1) the purpose and character of the use including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educations purposes; 2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; 3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 4) the 
effect upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 100 
D. Copyright Law and the Internet. 
The problem of copyrighted material and the Internet is summed up 
nicely by Stephen Elias. He writes: 
Copyright law is supposed to work in the electronic world as it does in 
the mere tangible worlds of print and the fine arts. However, once works 
are put into digital form and uploaded into cyberspace, keeping track of 
copyright ownership and enforcing copyrights becomes difficult. Works 
cast in digital form can be more easily copied and modified than when 
they exist on paper of canvas. And it can be difficult to know when the 
line between copyright violation and permissible copying of ideas has 
been crossed. Also, once a work has been posted in cyberspace it can be 
simultaneously copied by millions of users in many different countries, 
94. !d. 
95. !d. at 66. 
96. !d. 
97. !d. at 93. 
98. Jd. at 71. 
99. !d. 
100. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1976). 
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even if copying is illegal. There is no practical way to reassert control 
over work so that copyright can be meaningfully enforced. 101 
97 
It seems clear that courts have decided that copyright law does indeed 
extend to the Internet; however, the question of liability remains-who is 
to pay for copyright infringement? 
1. Downloading of copyrighted material onto the Internet 
It seems settled that the act of downloading copyrighted information 
onto the Internet is a violation of copyright law. The case United States v. 
LaMacchia illustrates this point. 102 In LaMacchia an MIT student was 
charged with violating copyright law by setting up a bulletin board called 
"Cynosure" and encouraging "correspondents to upload popular soft-
ware" which was then transferred to a second bulletin board "Cynosure 
II" where the software could be downloaded by other users. 103 While 
LaMacchia was not found guilty of wire fraud in the case, the court did 
find that copyright infringement had occurred and the LaMacchia was 
liable for the act. Unfortunately for the copyright owners, college stu-
dents typically don't have deep pockets. It would seem that the act of dis-
seminating copyrighted material on the Internet is covered by traditional 
copyright law. 
2. Liability of bulletin board service operators 
The liability of Bulletin Board Service Operators (BBS 's) is not as 
set as the liability for infringing down- or up-loaders. A BBS is in effect 
a "mini-community" on the Internet and about 100,000 of these exist 
throughout the world. 104 Each BBS has a systems operator or "Sysop." 
Sysops can set up BBS's relatively easily. All that is needed is a personal 
computer, a modem, and inexpensive BBS software. 
With a telephone call to the regional Internet access provider, who can 
supply a telephone leased line and additional software, the Sysop can 
put his or her BBS on the net. Once a BBS is created, its subscribers 
have virtually free reign to upload and download information transmit-
ted over the BBS. As a result, electronic bulletin boards raise a host of 
new legal issues regarding the liability of Sysops for the information 
transmitted over a BBS. 105 
101. Elias, supra note 94, at 98. 
102. United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994). 
103. !d. at 536. 
I 04. Heinke, supra note I 0, at 1. 
I 05. !d. at 2. 
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Two major cases have been decided which go to determining whether 
or not BBS's are liable for information which passes through them. 
a. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena. 106 In this case Playboy 
asserted that Frena was liable for use of Playboy copyrighted images 
which appeared on his BBS. Frena did not dispute that Playboy material 
had appeared on his BBS; however, he maintained that he was not liable 
because he had not uploaded the material and because he claimed that he 
removed the material once it had been brought to his attention. 107 Frena 
also maintained that the distribution of the material was covered by the 
fair use doctrine. 108 The court rejected Frena's arguments and held that 
"Intent to infringe is not needed to find copyright infringement" and that 
"an innocent infringer is liable for infringement." 109 Frena's fair use de-
fense was also rejected by the court which weighed the fair use factors. 
The first factor-the purpose and character of the use-went against 
Frena because BBS users paid to use Frena's BBS. The second fac-
tor--the nature of the copyrighted work-also went against Frena be-
cause the court held that entertainment works were entitled to greater 
protection than copyrighted works. The third factor-the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole-- too went against Frena. "The court noted that the photographs 
in Playboy magazine are an essential part of that copyrighted work." 110 
The court further stated that "[t]he court is not implying that people do 
not read the articles. However, a major factor [in the success of Playboy] 
is the photographs. " 111 The fourth factor-the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work-also went in 
Playboy's favor because if an individual could download the photographs 
from a magazine he or she would be less likely to purchase the magazine. 
All four factors of the fair use doctrine went in Playboy's favor and the 
court ultimately rejected Frena's argument. 
The court also rejected Frena's "innocence" argument, holding that 
since Frena had listed the photographs under the file names "Playboy" 
and "Playmate" and had removed Playboy's trademark from some of the 
photographs and substituted his own advertisement and phone number he 
was an active participant in the infringing activity. 112 Frena was thus 
found liable as a Sysop for copyright infringement. 
106. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D.Fla. 1993). 
!07. !d. at 1554. 
I 08. !d. at 1557. 
I 09. !d. at 1559. 
110. !d. at 1559. 
Ill. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1558. 
112. !d. at 1562. 
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b. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom 113 
In this case Religious Technology Center ("RTC"), the copyright 
holder for published and unpublished works of L. Ron Hubbard-the 
founder of the Church of Scientology- sued a BBS named 
"support.com", which was operated by Sysop Thomas Klemsrud. 114 
Klemsrud's BBS was connected to the Internet through Netcom On-Line 
Communication Services Inc. ("Netcom"). When RTC discovered its ma-
terial it appealed to Klemsrud and Netcom to keep the individual who 
was posting the information, Dennis Erlich, from using their service. 
Klemsrud refused to keep Erlich off the system unless RTC proved that it 
held the copyright-RTC denied this request. Netcom refused to deny 
Erlich access because it contended that it would have to shut down 
Klemsrud's whole BBS to affect Erlich. 115 Ultimately, the court held that 
neither Klemsrud nor Netcom was liable for the infringement, because 
neither had taken any affirmative action to infringe. The computers pos-
sessed by Klemsrud and Netcom were akin to copy machines. The court 
Sald: 
Netcom's act of designing or implementing a system that automatically 
and uniformly creates temporary copies of all data sent through it is not 
unlike that of the owner of a copying machine who lets the public make 
copies with it. Although some of the people using the machine may di-
rectly infringe copyrights, courts analyze the machine owner's liability 
under the rubric of contributory infringement, not direct infringement. 116 
The court also found that to hold any one liable whose computer server 
acted without human intervention would result in liability for every sin-
gle user in the worldwide link of computers transmitting a message to 
every other computer. 117 
The court then addressed whether Netcom and the BBS were liable 
for contributory infringement. The court maintained that contributory 
infringement can be found when the defendant acts "with knowledge of 
the infringing activity" and "induces, causes or materially contributes to 
the infringing conduct of another." 118 The court found that Netcom was 
contributorily liable. First, it held that Netcom, following the receipt of 
RTC's letter, knew or should have known that Erlich had infringed. Thus, 
113. Religious Tech. Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
114. /d. at 1365. 
115. /d. at 1366. 
116. /d. at 1369. 
117. /d. 
118. !d. at 1373 (quoting Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
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Netcom is liable because it failed to cancel Erlich's messages after being 
given information about their infringing content. Second it found that 
Netcom's participation was substantial once it became aware of Erlich's 
actions since it does not relinquish complete control over the system to 
the users. According to the court: 
Thus, it is fair, assuming Netcom is able to take simple measures to pre-
vent further damage to plaintiffs' copyrighted works, to hold Netcom 
liable for contributory infringement where Netcom has knowledge of 
Erlich's infringing postings yet continues to aid in the accomplishment 
of Erlich's purpose of publicly distributing the postings. 119 
Though the court found the possibility of contributory infringement, 
it next analyzed whether vicarious infringement could be attributed to 
Netcom. It held that Netcom would be vicariously liable where the defen-
dant "(1) has the right and ability to control the infringer's acts and (2) 
receives a direct financial benefit from the infringement." 120 The court 
held that Netcom indeed had the right and ability to control and that its 
argument that it was unable to limit Erlich's access without effecting the 
rest of Klemsrud's BBS users was groundless. 121 However, the court 
failed to find vicarious liability because there was no direct financial ben-
efit. Netcom collected a flat fee regardless of the amount or type of use 
by the customer-it was not collecting fees for the downloading of copy-
righted information. 122 
Finally, the court looked at whether or not a fair use defense was 
available in this situation using the four factors of fair use found in sec-
tion 17 U.S.C 107. The first factor-the purpose and character of the use, 
according to the court, was not dispositive. Thus, despite the fact that the 
use was commercial, "a commercial use does not dictate against a finding 
of fair use." 123 As to the second factor-the nature of the copyrighted 
material-the court held that though the works were original and cre-
ative, Netcom's purpose in using them was not the same as RTC's use. 124 
The court maintained that Netcom did not violate the third factor-the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole-because Netcom only used the amount neces-
sary for its purpose. That purpose was offering Internet service to cus-
tomers.125 The final factor-the effect upon the potential market for or 
119. Religious Tech. Center, 907 F. Supp. at 1375. 
120. !d. (citations omitted). 
121. !d. at 1376. 
122. !d. 
123. Id. at 1379. 
124. !d. 
125. !d. at 1379-80. 
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value of the copyrighted work-was the most important according to the 
court. It held that Netcom's posting of the infringing work would not 
have a detrimental effect on RTC gaining new members to its church. 126 
The court held that there was a triable issue of fact on the claim of 
contributory infringement and that the case should go forward. The RTC 
court laid out some very important ground work which will go to decid-
ing whether or not BBS services are liable for their users' possible trade-
mark infringement. The court seemed to say that so long as the BBS has 
no knowledge of infringing acts that there would be no liability. How-
ever, upon notice the BBS has a duty to intercede and stop the infringing 
action so far as possible. 
D. Copyright Conclusion 
There seems little question as to whether Internet users who upload 
copyrighted material will be held liable. However, the liability to BBS's 
is a bit more uncertain. The Playboy and RTC cases seem to stand for the 
proposition that so long as the BBS services do not know of the infringe-
ment occurring they will not be held liable. The courts also seem to have 
found a duty to stop the infringement when the BBS's do become aware 
of the actions. It would seem that upon learning of infringement that so 
long as the BBS acts in a reasonable manner to stop the transmission of 
the material that no liability will ensue. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It has been the goal of this paper to illustrate that traditional trade-
mark and copyright law can be effective in protecting these intellectual 
property rights in Cyberspace. To this end it has shown that in trademark 
infringement traditional trademark law can be applied. So far as copy-
right infringement is concerned, this paper has shown that this issue is 
not as mysterious as it might appear initially. Those who act to infringe 
on copyrights will be held liable, those who do not make affirmative ac-
tion will likely not be held liable. Protection of trademarks and copy-
righted material on the Internet seems to be headed in the direction that 
will lead to traditional intellectual property law being applied. 
While some have suggested the Internet is akin to a wild west town 
without a Sheriff, recent cases indicate that the Sheriff has e-mailed that 
he is on his way. Internet users rue the loss of their unregulated 
cyberspace, but they must realize that if cyberspace is to continue to al-
low the free flow of ideas, someone must take responsibility for infringe-
ment of trademarks and copyrights. InterNIC recently has made some 
126. !d. at 1380 
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effort in domain name and trademark protection. The courts seem to be 
doing the same in the area of copyright infringement. The day is coming 
when long time Internet users may recall fondly the days of the wild 
west, however, they must remember that it is the nature of humanity to 
seek law and guidelines. Internet users have the opportunity to began po-
licing themselves-to control their own town. Yes, the Sheriff must come 
to Cyberville, but he or she (or the cyber-it) has not yet arrived. With self 
regulation, Internet users still have the opportunity to be their own Sheriff 
rather than having one appointed. 
John R. Dean 
